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THE SQUEAL RULE: STATUTORY
RESOLUTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL
IMPLICATIONS-BURDENING
THE MINOR'S RIGHT OF
PRIVACY
Since 1942 the United States Supreme Court has on several
occasions considered individual rights related to sexual activity, and the
extent to which the government permissibly may infringe these rights.'
The individual's rights to make personal decisions regarding abortion
and contraception free from governmental intrusion derive from a
broader and more fundamental right of privacy 2 that the Court
consistently has recognized in these contexts. Concurrently, lawmakers
have enacted various statutes designed to increase parental authority
3
and curb sexual autonomy, 4 in an attempt to uphold traditional sexual
1. See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding state law requiring parental
notification before performing abortion on a minor); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (finding
constitutionally invalid a state law requiring parental consent for any nonemergency abortion unless
no parent available); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding unconstitutional
a state law criminalizing the distribution of nonprescription contraceptives to minors); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (upholding state law requiring parental consent for
abortion performed on a minor); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding unconstitutional state
criminal abortion statutes prohibiting abortion at any stage of pregnancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972) (state law prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons held to
violate equal protection clause); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (state law forbidding
use of contraceptives by married persons held to violate right of marital privacy); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating, under the equal protection clause, a state statute
which provided that a criminal offender should be sterilized upon a third conviction of felony
involving moral turpitude).
2. The evolution and scope of the right of privacy is discussed infra at text accompanying
notes 68-84. The term "right of privacy" will be used throughout this note to refer to decisions
relating to sexual privacy, including the freedom to make personal choices regarding contraception,
procreation, abortion, marriage, and sexual activity.
3. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, q 81-51 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984) (parental consent
required for unmarried minor seeking abortion); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 81-64 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1984) (24 hours notice given to parents of unmarried minor seeking abortion); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 112, § 12S (Michie/Law Co-op. Supp. 1984) (parental consent required for unmarried
minor seeking abortion); N. C: GEN. STAT. § 115C-378 (Supp. 1981) (parent empowered with
authority to require compulsory school attendance of minor child; parental notification required in
event of excessive school absences); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-03.1 (1981) (unmarried
pregnant minor seeking abortion requires parental consent); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23 - 4.7-6 (Supp.
1984) (parental consent required for unmarried minor seeking abortion); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-
304 (1978 replacement) (physician must notify parents of minor seeking abortion).
4. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-8 (Smith-Hurd 1979) (criminalizing "open and
notorious" cohabitation or sexual intercourse by unmarried persons); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177
1325
1326 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1984:1325
values. In response, the Supreme Court has struggled during the last
decade to carve out a standard for parental consent and notification that
reflects the delicate balance between the values of parental guidance and
the minor's fundamental right of privacy.5
On January 26, 1983, the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) promulgated regulations mandating parental
notification for unemancipated minors who seek prescription
contraceptives from federally funded family planning clinics. 6 Popularly
(1981) (criminalizing "the crime against nature"-defined by caselaw as oral or anal sexual activity
- by any persons); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (1981) (criminalizing cohabitation and "lewd and
lascivious associat[ion]" by unmarried persons); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-08 (1981)
(criminalizing any sexual contact by a minor); N.D. CENT. CODE 12.1-20-10 (1981) (criminalizing
cohabitation "as a married couple" by unmarried persons); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-02, -20
(1981) (criminalizing sexual contact with an "animal, bird, or dead person"); UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-5-403 (1978 replacement) (criminalizing oral or anal sex between persons, regardless of age or
sex); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-104 (1978 replacement) (criminalizing sexual intercourse between
unmarried persons).
5. See supra note 1.
6. In addition to redefining requirements of economic needs, the regulations amend 42 C.F.R.
Part 59 as follows:
42 C.F.R. 59.5 is amended by adding thereto the following paragraph (a)(12), to read as
follows:
§ 59.5 What requirements must be met by a family planning project?
(a) * * *
(12) Encourage, to the extent practical, family participation in the provision of the project's
services to unemancipated minors. Notwithstanding any other requirement of this subpart,
a project shall,
(i)(A) When prescription drugs or prescription devices are initially provided by the project
to an unemancipated minor, notify a parent or guardian that they %ere provided, within 10
working days following their provision. The project must tell the minor prior to the provi-
sion of services about this notification requirement. As used in this subsection, the phrase
"parent or guardian" shall refer to a parent or guardian residing with the minor or other-
wise exercising parental functions with respect to the minor. The project shall verify by
certified mail (with restricted delivery and return receipt requested), or other similar form
of documentation, that the notification has been received. Where the project is unable to
verify that notification was received, the project shall not provide additional prescription
drugs or devices to the minor.
(B) A project is not required to comply with paragraph (a)(12)(i)(A) of this section
where the project director or clinic head (when specifically so designated by the project
director) determines that notification will result in physical harm to the minor by a parent
or guardian.
(C) For the purposes of this paragraph (a)(12)(i), an "unemancipated minor" is an
individual who is age 17 or under and is not, with respect to factors other than age, emanci-
pated under State law.
(D) The project must keep records of notifications provided pursuant to the first sen-
tence of paragraph (a)(12)(i)(A) of this section, and of verification that those notifications
were received. The project must also keep records of the number of determinations made
under paragraph (a)(12)(i)(B) of this section and the factual basis for such determinations.
The project must make records required by this subparagraph available to the Secretary on
request.
(E) This paragraph (a)(12)(i) of this section does not apply where prescription drugs
are provided for the treatment of sexually transmitted diseases.
(ii) Where State law requires the notification or consent of a parent or guardian to the
provision of family planning services to an individual who is an unemancipated minor
under State law, provide such services only in the compliance with such law.
SQUEAL RULE
known as the "squeal rule,' 7 the regulation was designed to promote
-parental involvement in the minor's contraceptive decision.8
This note considers the validity of the "squeal rule" from both a
legislative and a constitutional perspective. Part I outlines the statutory
authority and legislative history underlying the rule as well as the recent
cases concluding that it contravenes congressional intent. 9 Because
future notification provisions may be upheld if promulgated under new
or different statutory authority, Part II considers whether the rule places
an unconstitutional burden10 on the exercise of a minor's right of
privacy, and analyzes state interests in protecting the child," cultivating
parental involvement,' 2 promoting morality, 13 protecting the health of
the minor, 14 and allocating scarce financial resources. 15  The note
concludes that the "squeal rule" unconstitutionally burdens the right of
privacy of mature minors who are capable of making intelligent
contraception decisions on their own.
I. CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND THE DHHS REGULATION
On January 26, 1983, the DHHS, pursuant to its authority under
Title X of the Public Health Service Act,16 amended the regulations gov-
erning the family planning services program. 17 The new rules, which
have generated "a great whirlwind of public controversy,"' 8 contain
three main provisions: (1) federally funded family planning facilities
must notify the parent or guardian of an unemancipated minor receiving
prescription contraceptives 19 within ten days of their provision;20 (2) the
7. See, e.g., Kiss and Tell-Squeal Rule Enjoined, 69 A.B.A. J. 829 (1983). Although the term
"squeal rule" technically applies only to the notification portion of the regulation, it is commonly
used to refer to the regulation as a whole. This note generally will use the term "squeal rule"
interchangeably with "the DHHS regulation" to refer to the entire regulation. The context should
make clear when it is used to refer only to the notification portion of the rule.
8. See 48 Fed. Reg. 3602 (1983).
9. See infra notes 16-63 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 64-115 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 116-42 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 143-54 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 155-61 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 162-72 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 et seq. (1982).
17. Grants for Family Planning Services, 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.2, 59.5(a)(12)(i), (ii) (1983).
18. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of America v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
19. The rule specifically applies to "prescription drugs or prescription devices," 42 C.F.R.
§ 59.5(a)(12)(i)(A) (1983), which include the pill, the IUD, and the diaphragm. Other methods of
contraception, including condoms, and spermicides, may be obtained over-the-counter and are not
subject to the notification requirement. 49 Fed. Reg. 3600, 3609 (1983).
20. The minor must be advised of this notification requirement before the provision of services.
42 CFR § 59.5(a)(12)(i)(A) (1983). The regulation contains two limited exceptions: notification is
1327Vol. 1984:1325]
1328 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1984:1325
facilities must comply with any existing state laws requiring parental no-
tification or consent for the provision of contraceptive services to mi-
nors;2 I and (3) in order to satisfy the low-income test for eligibility to
receive services on a confidential basis, minors must now be evaluated on
the basis of their parents' resources. 22
Even before the regulation was published in final form, institutional
family planning recipients of Title X funds filed actions in federal district
courts in four states to enjoin its enforcement.2 3 On February 8, 1983,
federal courts in New York and the District of Columbia enjoined en-
forcement of the regulation on the ground that it was promulgated in
excess of DHHS' delegated authority.24  The courts reasoned that by
mandating rather than merely encouraging family involvement, the regu-
lation contravened the clear congressional intent underlying Title X to
halt the epidemic of teenage pregnancies. 25
not required if the project director determines that "notification will result in physical harm to the
minor by a parent or guardian," 42 C.F.R. § 59.5(a)(12)(i)(B) (1983); and "prescription drugs pro.
vided for the treatment of sexually-transmitted diseases" are not subject to the regulation, 42 C.F.R.
§ 59.5(a)(12)(i)(E) (1983).
21. 42 C.F.R. § 59.5(a)(12)(i)(E)(ii) (1983). As of June 1983, Utah was the only state with such
a consent and notification statute. ALAN GUTTMACHER INST., MAKING CHoICEs: EVALUATING
THE HEALTH RISKS AND BENEFITS OF BIRTH CONTROL METHODS 26-27 (1983). In December
1983, a federal district court invalidated that statute on the alternative grounds that Title X
preempts it, and that the statute would permit an unconstitutional invasion of the privacy right to
decide whether to bear or beget children. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp.
1001, 1006, 1009 (D. Utah 1983) (discussed infra notes 32, 61).
22. The regulation repealed the following sentence from DHHS' definition of "low-income fam-
ily" for the purposes of family planning projects: "For example, unemancipated minors who wish to
receive services on a confidential basis must be considered on the basis of their own resources." 42
C.F.R. § 59.2 (1982). Title X regulations define a "low-income family" as "a family whose total
annual income does not exceed 100 percent of the most recent Community Services Administration
Income Poverty Guidelines." 42 C.F.R. § 59.2 (1983).
23. Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. 658 (D.D.C.), affd sub nom.
Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1983); New York v. Schweiker, 557
F. Supp. 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (preliminary injunction issued), permanent injunction issued without
published opinion, Nos. 83 Civ. 0726, 0727 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1983) (available Dec. 31, 1984 on
LEXIS Genfed library, Dist file), ajff'dsub nom. New York v. Heckler, 719 F.2d 1191 (2d Cir. 1983);
Memphis Ass'n of Planned Parenthood v. Schweiker, No. 83-2060 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 24, 1983) (or-
der granting preliminary injunction); Vincent v. Schweiker, No. 83-1 110-P (D. W. Va. Jan. 24, 1983)
(order granting preliminary injunction) (cited in Brief for Appellee Planned Parenthood at 2,
Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
24. New York v. Schweiker, 557 F. Supp. 354, 359-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (preliminary injunc-
tion); Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. 658 (D.D.C.) (permanent injunction),
aff'd sub nom. Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The Tennessee
district court issued a cursory injunction, noting its reliance on the rationale of these two opinions.
Memphis Ass'n of Planned Parenthood v. Schweiker, No. 83-2060 (W.D. Tenn. 1983).
25. New York v. Schweiker, 557 F. Supp. at 359-62; Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Schweiker,
559 F. Supp. at 665-69. To be valid, agency action must be consistent with the congressional pur-
pose underlying the authorizing statute. See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424-26 (1977).
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A. Title X.
In 1970, Congress created Title X26 to establish a system of federally
funded public and nonprofit-private family planning projects providing a
broad range of family planning services. 27  Title X grantees provided
services to teenagers from the inception of the program.28 Yet, because
of the increasing pregnancy rate among this group throughout the
1970's, Congress became concerned that the original Title X program
was inadequate to meet the contraceptive needs of sexually active teen-
agers. 29 Responding to the argument that the "virtual epidemic of teen-
age pregnancies require[d] emergency measures" targeted specifically at
adolescents,3 0 Congress amended Title X in 1978 to include language
clarifying its intent that Title X projects provide "services for adoles-
cents."' 3' Congress thus intended the program "to assist sexually active
adolescents to avoid unwanted pregnancies. '32
26. Pub. L. No. 91-572, 84 Stat. 1504 (1970).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 300 (1982).
28. See 42 C.F.R. § 59.5(a)(4)(1981) (Title X services were to be provided "without regard to
...age, sex, . . . or marital status.") (emphasis added).
29. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1161, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1974) ("certain population groups
requiring these services are not being reached. . . includ[ing] teenagers").
30. Brief for Appellee, National Family Planning & Reproductive Health Association
(NFPRHA) at 10, Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1983) [hereinafter
cited as Brief for NFPRHA].
31. 42 U.S.C. § 300(a) (1982).
32. S. Rep. No. 822, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1978) ("The Committee is convinced that existing
family planning programs' efforts to reach adolescents must be maintained and that special efforts
must be made to expand these efforts.").
Proponents of the campaign to encourage teenagers' use of Title X's contraceptive services care-
fully stated that the new provision "should not be construed as condoning adolescent sexual activity.
Rather, [the 1978 amendment] deals with reality and simply attempts to provide young people with
the information necessary to avoid pregnancy." 124 Cong. Rec. 31,248 (1978) (statement of Rep.
Whaler).
Consistent with Title X, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) Program and
the Medicaid Program of the Social Security Act require participating states to furnish prompt fam-
ily planning "services and supplies" to sexually active minors. The AFDC program requires state
plans to
provide. . . for the development of a program, .... for preventing or reducing the inci-
dence of births out of wedlock and otherwise strengthening family life, and for implement-
ing such program by assuring that in all appropriate cases (including minors who can be
considered to be sexually active) family planning services are offered to them and are pro-
vided promptly. ...
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(15)(A) (1982).
The Medicaid Program of the Social Security Act defines "medical assistance" as
payment of part or all of the costs of. . . family planning services and supplies furnished
, .* to individuals of child-bearing age (including minors who can be considered to be
sexually active) who are eligible under the State plan and who desire such services and
supplies. . ..
42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(C) (1982).
By expressly including such requirements in each of three programs, Congress sought to estab-
lish a federal policy that "prevents the vagaries of state law from disrupting the national scheme, and
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The legislative history of Title X reflects a congressional commit-
ment to two paramount policies regarding contraceptive services for ado-
lescents: (1) encouraging family involvement in a teenager's
contraceptive decision;33 and (2) maintaining patient confidentiality re-
garding personal facts disclosed during the provision of services. 34
In an effort to reiterate its commitment to family involvement, Con-
gress amended Title X in 1981 to include the following language: "[t]o
the extent practical, entities which receive grants or contracts under [Ti-
tle X] shall encourage family participation in projects assisted under this
subsection."' 35 The Conference Committee Report accompanying the
amendment, however, clearly indicated the secondary nature of the fam-
ily involvement goal:
The conferees believe that, while family involvement is not man-
dated, it is important that families participate in the activities author-
ized by this title as much as possible. It is the intent of the Conferees
that grantees will encourage participants in Title X programs to include
their families in counseling and involve them in decisions about
services. 36
guarantees a national uniformity that enhances the effectiveness of congressional policy." Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. 1001, 1004-05 (D. Utah 1983) (quoting Hisquierdo v.
Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 584 (1979)). Thus, a federal district court recently invalidated a state
notification statute identical to the DHHS "squeal rule" as (1) pre-empted by the legislative intent
underlying Title X, and (2) unconstitutional under City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983) and H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981). Planned Parenthood
Ass'n v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. at 1004-09.
33. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 29, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1975) ("unmarried teenagers, where
feasible, should be encouraged to involve their family in their decision about use of contraceptives");
124 CoNG. REC. 16,448 (1978) (statement of Sen. Cranston) ("unemancipated minors requesting
family planning services will be encouraged by projects, whenever feasible, to consult with the par-
ents with respect to such services").
34. S. REP. No. 102, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1977). DHHS regulations originally adopted in
1972 pursuant to Title X still expressly protect this confidentiality:
All information as to personal facts and circumstances obtained by the project staff about
individuals receiving services must be held confidential and must not be disclosed without
the individual's consent, except as may be necessary to provide services to the patient or as
required by law, with appropriate safeguards for confidentiality.
42 C.F.R. § 59.11 (1983) (originally codified at 42 C.F.R. § 59.10 (1972)).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 300(a) (1982). The dispute over statutory construction between the Secretary
of DHHS and opponents of the regulations revolves in large part around the words "shall en-
courage" and the breadth of authority conferred by such language. According to the Secretary, the
word "shall" imposes a "nondiscretionary duty" on Title X grantees to communicate directly with
the parents in order to involve them in the child's family planning decisions. See Brief for the
Department of Health and Human Services at 18-19, Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Heckler, 712
F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Brief for DHHS].
36. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 208, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 799 (1981), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 596, 1161 (emphasis added) ("unemancipated minors requesting family planning serv-
ices will be encouraged by projects, whenever feasible, to consult with the parents with respect to
such services").
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In addition to encouraging family involvement, Congress, with the
interests of the adolescent clientele in mind, has insisted upon a policy of
confidentiality in the Title X programs throughout the history of Title
X.37 In 1978, Congress rejected an attempt to undermine this confidenti-
ality, soundly defeating, by a vote of 45-10 in the Senate, 38 a proposed
amendment to Title X39 that would have required parental notification of
a clinic's intent to prescribe or dispense prescription contraceptives to
minors under the age of sixteen.4°
Although these dual congressional goals of family involvement and
confidentiality are not inherently incompatible, the issue of the extent to
which each goal properly may be pursued at the expense of the other
remains. As a practical matter, striking a reasonable balance between the
goals may be difficult because pursuit of one often depends on relinquish-
ment of the other. There are essentially two options: clinics may culti-
vate parental involvement by direct communication with parents, over
the adolescent's objection, thereby breaching patient confidentiality; or
clinics may encourage the adolescent patient herself to involve her par-
37. Indeed, congressional efforts to induce teenagers to take advantage of the services offered by
Title X clinics were sensitive to the adolescent's very real apprehension that her parents would dis-
cover that she was seeking contraceptives and was therefore sexually active. See S. REP. No. 822,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1978) (quoting Willie Hamilton, President of the National Family Planning
Forum and Executive Director of the Arkansas Family Planning Council: "the teenager may be
rightfully concerned that her parents will learn or be told of her request for contraception"). A
recent study by the Alan Guttmacher Institute of the reasons why adolescents prefer family planning
clinics to private physicians reveals that over 30% of the adolescents fear that a private doctor might
tell their parents of the request for contraceptives. Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Schweiker, 559 F.
Supp. 658, 666 n.14 (D.D.C.), affd sub nom. Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650
(D.C. Cir. 1983). As a result, the "well publicized and zealously guarded policy of confidentiality
ensured by the clinics," id. at 666, has been a key factor in successfully attracting teenagers to family
planning centers funded by Title X.
According to the most recent comprehensive study of birth control practices among American
women, 55% of all teenagers using a prescription contraceptive obtain these contraceptives through
family planning clinics. ALAN GUTrMACHER INST., supra note 21, at 18. An earlier study of vary-
ing consent and notification policies among family planning facilities suggested that those facilities
with minimal consent or notification policies experienced a significantly higher attendance rate by
teenagers than those facilities with more intrusive requirements. Torres, Forest & Eisman, Telling
Parents: Clinic Policies and Adolescents' Use of Family Planning and Abortion Services, 12 FAM.
PLAN. PERSP. 284, 287 (1980) (especially Table 4).
38. 124 CONG. REC. 37,044 (1978).
39. Id. (popularly known as the Volkmer amendment).
40. Text of amendment at 124 CONG. REc. 37,044 (1978). The debate surrounding the
Volkmer amendment is particularly instructive. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. 37,047 (1978) (statement
of Rep. Preyer) ("If we are going to put some clout behind the intent of [Title X], we must think first
and foremost about what can be done to prevent teenage pregnancies. . . . [I]f these teenagers...
have to seek parental consent for contraception, the whole intent of this legislation will be under-
mined."); id. (statement of Rep. Rogers); id. at 37,048 (statement of Rep. Weiss) ("I believe that
passage of these amendments would . . . result in an increase of unplanned and unwanted
pregnancies.").
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ents, thereby preserving patient confidentiality. 4' Faced with these op-
tions, the DHHS regulation resolved the conflict in favor of direct
communication with parents.
B. The DHHS Regulation.
New York v. Schweiker 42 and Planned Parenthood Federation of
America v. Schweiker 43 articulated the judiciary's disapproval of the
DHHS regulation just two weeks after its promulgation. Although the
regulation purported to "implement [the] 1981 amendment to Title X
. . . to encourage, to the extent practical, family participation in the pro-
vision of [family planning] services," 44 both courts concluded that the
mandatory notification requirement would undermine Title X's basic
purpose: "stemming the increase in unwanted births and pregnancies"
among teenagers.45
According to the courts, statistical evidence and logic indicated that
such intrusive notification requirements would deter adolescents from us-
ing the Title X clinics. 46 Moreover, most adolescents denied confidential
access to Title X services would be unable to obtain adequate contracep-
41. Brief for NFPRHA, supra note 30, at 6.
42. 557 F. Supp. 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (issuing a preliminary injunction). The district court
subsequently issued a permanent injunction. New York v. Schweiker, Nos. 83 Civ. 0726, 0727
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1983) (available Dec. 31, 1984 on LEXIS Genfed library, Dist file), affd sub
nom. New York v. Heckler, 719 F.2d 1191 (2d Cir. 1983).
43. 559 F. Supp. 658 (D.D.C. 1983), affd sub nom. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Heckler, 712
F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
44. 48 Fed. Reg. 3600 (1983); see also supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
45. Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. at 668; New York v. Schweiker, 557
F. Supp. at 359; Brief for Planned Parenthood at 9, Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Heckler,
712 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing S. Rep. No. 822, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1978), H.R. Rep.
No. 1191, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1978)).
46. Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. at 666; New York v. Schweiker, 557
F. Supp. at 359. According to the most recent figures compiled by the DHHS, 615,000 persons aged
17 and younger utilized Title X clinics in 1981. Supporting Statement for Recordkeeping Require-
ments in Regulations Governing Family Planning Projects Funded Under Title X (cited in Adden-
dum F to Brief for NFPRHA, supra note 30, at 58). Ninety-six per cent of this group consisted of
unemancipated minors. Almost 80% of these teenagers chose prescription methods of contracep.
tives. Kenney, Forest & Torres, Storm Over Washington: The Parental Notification Proposal, 14
FAM. PLAN. PEaRSP. 185 (1982). Adjusting its data to account for a minimal number of otherwise
unemancipated unmarried adolescents who are nevertheless exempt from the regulations because
they have previously given birth, the DHHS concluded that the total number of unemancipated
adolescents who received prescription contraceptives from Title X clinics in 1981 and are thus poten-
tially affected by the regulations is 418,900. Supporting Statement of Recordkeeping Requirements
in Regulations Governing Family Projects Funded Under Title X (cited in Addendum F to Brief for
NFPRHA, supra note 30, at 58).
When 1211 teenagers were surveyed concerning their likely reaction to such mandatory notifi-
cation requirements, 23% responded that they would stop attending the clinics. Torres, Forest &
Eisman, supra note 37 at 290. Indeed, the District Court for the District of Columbia in the Planned
Parenthood case noted that "the mere proposal of the notification requirement . . . resulted in a
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tive care from alternative sources because of the prohibitively high cost
of obtaining prescription contraceptives from a private physician,4 7 and
because nonprescription contraceptives which may be obtained relatively
inexpensively from a drugstore are, as a practical matter, "significantly
less effective than prescription contraceptives.
' '48
The courts concluded that the deterrent effects of the regulations
pointed to one inevitable result-a significant increase in teenage
pregnancies, 49 precisely the problem Congress sought to remedy through
Title X. The conclusion rested upon studies suggesting that the number
of adolescent pregnancies, abortions, and births would rise significantly if
the regulation were to take effect, because of the expected changes in
contraceptive use.50 One report indicated that "in one year, an addi-
significant drop in adolescent attendance at family planning clinics." Planned Parenthood Fed'n v.
Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. at 666 n.13.
The district court opinion in Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847 (D. Mass. 1975), considered the
16-year old plaintiff's reasons for not wanting her parents to know of her sexual activity and subse-
quent pregnancy:
Her father had told her, in connection with the pregnancy of a contemporary friend, that if
that happened to her he would evict her and kill her boy friend. She did not know how far
to believe this, except that she felt certain he would take some physical action against the
boy. . . . Her reasons for not informing her parents were in part apprehension of what
might happen to her as a result of their learning she had had intercourse, in part the fear of
what would happen to her boy friend, and in part the desire to spare her parents' feelings.
Id. at 850.
Unfortunately, while the "squeal rule" and its counterparts would certainly result in a signifi-
cant decrease in contraceptive use by teenagers, it would not be likely to alter their sexual activity,
even without protection. "The evidence . . . suggests that many minors will not quickly manifest
the self-discipline counseled by the government, and will remain sexually active." Planned
Parenthood Fed'n v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. at 666. When 641,000 sexually active teenagers were
asked what alternatives they would resort to if effective contraceptives became unavailable, 87,000
said that they would "switch to nonprescription methods, including withdrawal and rhythm, which
have been shown to have relatively high failure rates," and another 26,000 said that they would
continue to be sexually active without using any method. Torres, Forest & Eisman, supra note 37, at
291.
47. The average first-year costs of prescription methods of contraceptions obtained through a
private physician, including both the costs of supplies and medical care, are $172 for the pill, $160
for the diaphragm, and $130 for the IUD. Excluding the possibility of subsequent office visits, the
yearly costs after the first year taper off to approximately $107, $66, and $95 respectively. ALAN
GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 21, at 21. Adolescent patients receiving the same supplies and
services from family planning clinics, by contrast, pay nothing if they qualify as low-income patients,
or only a minimal fee if they do not. It is not surprising, therefore, that 60% of adolescents surveyed
preferred the clinic "because a doctor is too expensive." Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Schweiker,
559 F. Supp. at 666 n.14.
48. Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. at 666; see ALAN GUTrMACHER
INST., supra note 21, at 5-9.
49. New York v. Schweiker, 557 F. Supp. at 359; Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Schweiker, 559
F. Supp. at 666.
50. Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. at 663 ("The studies and affidavits
submitted by the plaintiffs convincingly demonstrate that the regulations will deter minors from
attending family planning clinics and thereby increase their risk of becoming pregnant.") (citing
Torres, Forest & Eisman, supra note 37, at 290-91). Appellee-NFPRHA concluded that "the regu-
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tional 33,000 adolescents aged 17 or younger would become pregnant,
resulting in 14,000 abortions, 9,000 out-of-wedlock births, and 4,000
miscarriages. '51
Although the "squeal rule" portion of the DHHS regulation re-
ceived more publicity because of its explicit notification requirement,
both courts also held that the regulation's economic eligibility require-
ments for contraceptive services under Title X imposed a de facto notifi-
cation requirement that was equally suspect because "it has the same
effect as the parental notification requirement." z52  The Planned
Parenthood court observed that "[i]n order to determine whether she is
qualified to receive services from the clinic, a minor would be required to
obtain financial information from her parents," creating a "de facto pa-
rental notification requirement. ' ' 53 The court further observed that the
redefinition of economic eligibility in effect imposed a consent require-
ment on minors who cannot qualify for subsidized services because their
parents are too affluent. 54 If the minor has no funds of her own,55 she
would, in most instances, be forced to solicit financial assistance from her
parents in order to pay for contraceptive services. "A parent could pre-
vent her child from receiving contraceptive services simply by refusing to
pay for them."'56
Given the legislative history of Title X and the likely consequences
of the DHHS regulation, both New York v. Schweiker 57 and Planned
lations would have the immediate and irreparable consequence of causing about 1000 unwanted
births and about 1000 abortions each month." Brief of NFPRHA, supra note 30, at 8. "The long
term adverse social and economic effects of births to women in this young age-group, especially of
unintended and out-of-wedlock births and of early, forced marriages, have been well documented."
Torres, Forest & Eisman, supra note 37, at 291 (citing, inter alia, Baldwin & Cain, The Children of
Teenage Parents, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 34 (1980); Fustenberg, The Social Consequences of Teenage
Parenthood, 8 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 148 (1976); Moore & Caldwell, The Effect of Government Policies
on Out-of-Wedlock Sex and Pregnancy, 9 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 164 (1977)).
51. Torres & Eisman, The Impact of Restrictions on the Provision of Birth Control and Abor-
tion Services on Teenage Fertility, (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Public
Health Association, Detroit, October 19-23, 1980, cited in Torres, Forest & Eisman, supra note 37,
at 291).
52. Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. at 669; see also New York v.
Schweiker, 557 F. Supp. at 362.
53. Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. at 669.
54. Id.
55. Many teenagers cannot easily afford the cost of contraceptive services obtained through
private sources. See supra note 47.
56. Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. at 669.
57. Nos. 83 Civ. 0726, 0727 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1983) (unpublished order granting permanent
injunction) (available Dec. 31, 1984 on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file), aff'd sub nom. New York
v. Heckler, 719 F.2d 1191 (2d Cir. 1983). The court's earlier order of a preliminary injunction is
available as a published opinion. New York v. Schweiker, 557 F. Supp. at 362 (Plaintiffs "have
established a very strong probability of succeeding on their claim that the regulations are contrary to
the intent of Congress and would defeat the basic purpose of Title X.")
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Parenthood v. Schweiker 58 permanently enjoined the enforcement of the
regulation as promulgated in contravention of its authorizing statute and
thus, in excess of the DHHS' delegated authority. Adopting the lower
courts' reasoning, appellate courts affirmed their decisions.
5 9
Because the only courts to consider the DHHS regulation thus far
have invalidated it on statutory grounds, no court6° has addressed the
constitutional issues raised by the federal regulation. 61 The trial and ap-
pellate courts in both New York v. Schweiker and Planned Parenthood v.
Schweiker expressly reserved the question of the constitutionality of the
58. 559 F. Supp. at 669. (defendants "permanently enjoined from implementing or enforcing
regulations amending 42 C.F.R. Part 59").
59. New York v. Heckler, 719 F.2d 1191 (2d Cir. 1983), affig New York v. Schweiker, Nos. 83
Civ. 0726, 0727 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1983) (available Dec. 31, 1984 on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file); Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1983), affg Planned
Parenthood Fed'n v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. 658 (D.D.C. 1983). Although split panels decided
both the District of Columbia and the Second Circuit cases, the majority opinions in each denounced
the validity of the regulations after an exhaustive statutory analysis. Finding the Conference Com-
mittee Report to be "a crystal clear and unequivocal expression of congressional intent," the District
of Columbia Circuit concluded that the rulemaking authority of the DHHS does not extend to
permitting Title X grantees to communicate directly with the parents as a means of fulfilling the
statute's "family participation" directive. 712 F.2d at 657. Title X clinics may permissibly be re-
quired to encourage their adolescent patients to involve their parents in a dialogue, but the clinics
may not initiate this dialogue with the parents over the child's objection because "Congress most
definitely did not intend to mandate family involvement." Id. (emphasis in original). Judge Skelly
Wright, writing for the District of Columbia panel, diplomatically noted that the decision did not
pass on the moral and political wisdom of the regulations, but only on their legality. Id. at 665.
The dissenters in each case did not challenge the majorities' interpretations of the relevant legis-
lative history, nor did they refute the appellees' statistical findings concerning the likelihood of in-
creased teenage pregnancies. Judge Bork in the District of Columbia Circuit dissented only to the
extent that DHHS should have had an opportunity to correct its initial errors and lawfully reissue
the regulations under proper authority before the courts conclusively determined their validity. Id.
at 667. Judge Friendly dissented in part in the Second Circuit case on the ground that the entire
proceedings were merely duplicative of the District of Columbia proceedings which already had been
resolved on appeal three months earlier. 719 F.2d at 1197-98. Because an effective injunction al-
ready had issued, which the Second Circuit could not affect, its holding was merely an "advisory
opinion" in Friendly's view. Id. at 1198.
60. Although many expected the Justice Department to seek Supreme Court review of both the
District of Columbia and the Second Circuit decisions, the Reagan administration made a last-min-
ute decision not to seek review in the High Court because there was no conflict among the circuits.
Wash. Post, Dec. 1, 1983, at A21, col. 1.
61. Cf Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 306-07 (1980) ("It is well settled that if a case may be
decided on either statutory or constitutional grounds, [a court], for sound jurisprudential reasons,
will inquire first into the statutory question."). Nevertheless, a federal district court in Utah recently
considered the constitutionality of a state statute similar to the DHHS regulation. Although the
court held the statute invalid as preempted by Title X, it also went on to hold it unconstitutional as
an infringement of privacy interests, particularly a minor's "constitutionally protected right to de-
cide whether to bear or beget a child by using contraceptives." Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Mathe-
son, 582 F. Supp. 1001, 1009 (D. Utah 1983).
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regulation, 62 noting the privacy rights implicated. The constitutional
questions, however, are far from moot because a reauthorized "squeal
rule" that could withstand statutory challenge would be subject to con-
stitutional review. Because Congress has never expressly prohibited the
Secretary of DHHS from adopting a parental notification rule, DHHS
might promulgate a modified squeal rule without legislative action, under
the authority of an existing statute other than Title X.63 Alternatively,
the possibility exists that Congress may enact "squeal rule" legislation.
Because these possibilities remain, this note will consider the consti-
tutional implications of the "squeal rule." Even though the separate is-
sues of parental notification and consent, minors' privacy rights, and
governmental benefits have received extensive judicial and legislative
treatment, the questions raised by the "squeal rule" remain unresolved.
Because the "squeal rule" involves all of these issues, it offers a unique
62. See New York v. Heckler, 719 F.2d at 1194 n.3; Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Heckler, 712
F.2d at 654 n.21; Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. 669 n.19; New York v.
Schweiker, 557 F. Supp. at 362.
63. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Heckler, 712 F.2d at 667 (Bork, J., dissenting). Arguing
that the DHHS should be given an opportunity to decide whether to readopt the regulations under
some statutory authority other than the 1981 amendments, the dissent in the District of Columbia
appeal points out that the
Secretary . . . has a rulemaking power that would authorize the notification regulation
challenged here unless Congress has deprived the Secretary of that particular authority.
Certainly Congress has not done so by any statutory language, and. . . only a few snippets
of. . . legislative history. . . can offer any support at all for an inference of congressional
restriction of otherwise broad agency authority.
Id. (Bork, J., dissenting). On appeal, the DHHS urged that Title XX, the Adolescent Family Life
Demonstration Projects Act, provided alternative authorization for the "squeal rule" because that
statute expressly requires family involvement by mandating parental notification and consent, in
addition to determining eligibility for the program on the basis of family income. See 42 U.S.C. §§
300-5(a)(22)(A)(i), -3(c) (1982). Arguing that Congress' philosophical intent in Title XX logically
informs any interpretation of Title X because Title XX was enacted as part of the same legislative
packet as the 1981 amendment to Title X, DHHS contended that congressional approval of parental
notification in one context implies such approval in a related context. See Brief for DHHS, supra
note 35, at 22-24. The court rejected this argument by distinguishing the "very different nature of
the two programs" created by the two statutes. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Heckler, 712 F.2d
at 661-63. The court stated:
Title X is the largest of the Federal Government's family planning programs, designed to
serve the family planning needs of all persons in need of such services. Title XX, by con-
trast, is a limited and experimental program; it provides for "demonstration projects" with
a special emphasis on serving the needs of already pregnant adolescents and the prevention
of adolescent sexual relations. . . . While some traditional family planning services may
be provided under limited circumstances, .... the primary thrust of Title XX clearly lies
elsewhere.
The distinct differences in the scope and purposes of the two programs necessarily
dictate different approaches to striking an appropriate balance between the need for confi-
dentiality and the goal of parental involvement.
Id. at 661-62.
Suggestions of more viable sources of alternative legislative authority are beyond the scope of
this note.
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invitation to consider the constitutional questions that arise where they
overlap and interact.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The law of substantive due process prescribes a standard method of
analysis to determine the constitutionality of governmental regulation
that burdens a fundamental right.64 In order to justify such legislation
and withstand constitutional scrutiny, the government must demonstrate
that a sufficient governmental interest 65 is served by the regulation. The
64. The right of privacy cases generally have involved challenges to state laws brought under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and are thus part of the case law of substantive
due process. Although the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the federal government, the
same right to privacy limitations do. See infra note 65. Even if it is technically incorrect to speak of
a "substantive due process" right to privacy in relation to the federal government, it is frequently
done. See, e.g., Miller v. Rumsfield, 647 F.2d 80, 85-86 (Norris, J., dissenting from denial of rehear-
ing en bane). This merely points out the similarity of the interests and analysis involved, whether in
relation to state or federal regulations. See infra note 65.
65. The boundaries of the right of privacy generally have been drawn in cases dealing with state
regulations. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Thus, where the right of privacy is burdened, the state's interests in furthering the goals served by
the challenged regulation must be weighed in order to determine whether its imposition is constitu-
tionally permissible. Wade, 410 U.S. at 162-64. This limitation, however, is not restricted to state
legislation. Rather, because the right of privacy finds its basis in the Bill of Rights, see infra note 68,
it limits the power of government in general, not just that of the states. Thus, no lesser showing of
governmental interest should be sufficient to uphold a federal regulation than is required to uphold a
state regulation. Cf United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77, 381-82 (1968) (applying to
federal government standards of review developed in first amendment challenges to state government
regulations). If anything, a greater showing should be required. After all, the Bill of Rights was
framed to apply against the federal government directly; its protection against state legislation is
realized only indirectly through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See generally
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11-2 (1978).
One may argue that state power is distinguishable from federal power in that the Constitution
does not confer upon Congress the general police power which the states traditionally exercise to
protect the "public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust
Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 120-21 (1928). However, as Congress may act to promote health and
morality through its taxing and spending or other federal powers, federal interests in such goals
arguably should be accorded a weight similar to the corresponding state interests. Cf. Hamilton v.
Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 155-56 (1919) (no valid objection that exer-
cise of federal power may be attended by the same incidents which attend exercise by a state of its
police power or that it may tend to accomplish a similar purpose).
General constitutional principles aside, with respect to a program such as Title X, state and
federal government action and interests are inextricably intertwined. Because the DHHS "squeal
rule" was to be applied by arms of the state governments that participate in Title X programs, see
supra note 27 and accompanying text, its underlying rationale might be treated in part as a tradi-
tional expression of state interests. Thus, this note will assume that the same interests that would be
required to uphold a state regulation might also be sufficient to justify a federal "squeal rule."
Because the regulation at issue was promulgated by the federal government, it is the federal
government in this instance that has the burden of proving a sufficient federal governmental interest.
Because the interests of the federal government mirror the interests of state and local governments
with respect to the rights at issue, and because the "squeal rule" requires state governments to
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strength of any such governmental interest depends upon the nature of
the right restricted. As a general rule, legislation that infringes funda-
mental rights must be justified by the showing of a "compelling state
interest."'66 Similarly, the strength of the relationship required to be
proved between the regulation and the futherance of the state's interest
depends upon the constitutional strength of the right. Thus, where a
fundamental right is involved, the state has the burden of proving that
the regulation is necessary to achieve its "compelling interest. ' 67
A. The Right of Privacy.
It is well-settled that the Constitution protects a fundamental right
of privacy, which encompasses certain zones of personal privacy. 68 Indi-
vidual freedom to make personal decisions regarding contraception is
firmly established as part of this right of privacy. 69 In Griswold v. Con-
necticut, the Supreme Court invalidated a state statute which criminal-
participate in its enforcement, the terms "governmental interests" and "state interests" will be used
interchangeably throughout this note.
66. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
67. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (a legitimate purpose may not be
achieved by regulations that "sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms' ") (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964); cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 634 (1969) ("any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of [the constitutional
right to travel], unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is
unconstitutional") (emphasis in original), cited in Wade, 410 U.S. at 155. But cf infra notes 111-15
and accompanying text (somewhat less rigorous standards may apply to limitations on minor's
rights).
68. Although not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the right of privacy has been derived
from a number of constitutional sources, including the first amendment, see Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 564 (1969), the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, cf Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (recognizing right "to marry, establish a home and bring up
children"), the ninth amendment, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965)
(Goldberg, J., concurring), and the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, see id. at 484-85.
Although this guarantee 6f constitutional protection extends only to those rights deemed "fun-
damental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973)
(quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)), the Supreme Court historically has con-
strued the right of privacy broadly enough to encompass personal choices that are integral to the
individual's bodily integrity and sense of self, even when these choices do not necessarily reflect
majoritarian values.
The Court has recognized a fundamental right of privacy in the areas of marriage, see Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); procreation, see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942);
family relationships, cf Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (recognizing "the private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter") (dicta); child rearing and education, cf Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (under the "fundamental theory of liberty upon whlich all
governments in this Union repose" parents have right to educate their children in parochial schools);
cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (due process right "to marry, establish a home and
bring up children"); contraception, see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); and abortion,
see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
69. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
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ized the use of contraceptives on the ground that it violated a
fundamental right of privacy inherent in the marital relationship. 70
Seven years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court held that the right to
use contraceptives applied equally to unmarried persons because no ra-
tional justification existed for the statutory distinction between married
and unmarried persons.7 1 In Carey v. Population Services International,
the Court declared unconstitutional a state statute prohibiting the distri-
bution of contraceptives to minors under the age of sixteen, holding that
the "decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart
of [the] cluster of constitutionally protected choices" contemplated by
the right of privacy.72 Griswold and Eisenstadt, therefore, established the
right to use contraceptives free from unwarranted governmental inter-
vention, while Carey established an essentially derivative right of access
to contraceptives.7 3
The right to reproductive freedom implicit in the right of privacy
arguably encompasses the right to engage in nonmarital sexual activity as
well. The irony that pervades the Supreme Court's line of cases recog-
nizing the individual right to make contraceptive decisions,7 4 however, is
its steadfast reluctance to acknowledge the right to engage in the sexual
activity that gives rise to these decisions in the first place.7 5 The only
clear guidelines the Court has offered to determine whether certain sex-
70. 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
71. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
72. 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
73. Id. at 687-89. The right of access to contraceptives is not fundamental in and of itself, but
rather derives from the right to use them, because "access is essential to exercise of the constitution-
ally protected right of decision in matters of childbearing." Id. at 688.
74. Decisions whether to bear or beget a child encompass the decision to abort the pregnancy.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
75. One commentator cryptically suggests that "[c]ontraception and sexual relations are simply
two different things, one of which can be given legal protection without protecting the other."
Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individ-
ual and Social Interests, 81 MicH. L. REV. 463, 531 (1983). However, the decision to engage in
sexual activity logically precedes-and is therefore implied in-the decision to use a contraceptive.
In a footnote, the plurality opinion in Carey sidestepped the question that the parties had urged
upon the Court: "We observe that the Court has not definitively answered the difficult question
whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating [private consensual
sexual behavior] among adults." Carey, 431 U.S. at 694 n.17 (plurality opinion). In separate concur-
ring and dissenting opinions, however, Justices Powell and Rehnquist expressed a more definitive
position on this subject. Cautioning that sexual freedom should not be defined too broadly to give
"extraordinary" constitutional protection, Justice Powell argued that "there is. . .no justification
for subjecting restrictions on the sexual activity of the young to heightened judicial review." Id. at
705 (Powell, J., concurring). According to Justice Rehnquist, the Court's summary affirmance of
Doe v. Commonwealth Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), mem. afj'g 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va.
1975) (upholding the constitutionality of a statutory prohibition of sodomy between consenting
adults), definitively established the "facial constitutional validity" of state restrictions on consensual
activity. Carey, 431 U.S. at 718 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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ual activity is constitutionally protected have been given in the context of
the marital relationship, 76 or involved procreative capacities that may
give rise to a mother-child relationship. 77 Nevertheless, that the Court
has recognized a fundamental right to use contraceptives implies that
there is no procreative prerequisite for constitutional protection of ordi-
nary heterosexual intercourse.
If there is a constitutionally protected right to make certain personal
decisions regarding one's sexual activity, it is necessary to determine
whether this right applies with equal force to minors. The Supreme
Court consistently has recognized that "a child, merely on account of his
minority, is not beyond the protection of the Constitution. ' 78 More spe-
cifically, the Court expressly has held that "the right to privacy in con-
nection with decisions affecting procreation extends to minors as well as
to adults."'79
While recognizing a minor's general right to constitutional protec-
tion, the Court nevertheless has concluded in a variety of contexts that
"the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of
adults." 80 Broader restrictions on the rights of minors frequently are jus-
tified as a means of protecting a minor against her own immaturity and
76. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
77. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942). Hafen argues that the cases
dealing with contraceptive rights, including abortion, for unmarried persons restrict the term "right
of privacy" to those decisions regarding childbearing. Hafen, supra note 75, at 519-20. Indeed,
Eisenstadt and Carey speak of the fundamental nature of the contraceptive right only in relation to
the "decision whether to bear or beget a child," Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453; Carey, 431 U.S. at 685,
and do not address the privacy interest inherent in the circumstances leading to the decision.
78. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979); see also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess consti-
tutional rights"); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) ("neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the
Bill of Rights is for adults alone"). For a survey of the Supreme Court's "ad hoc adjudication" of the
various constitutional rights extended to minors, see generally Note, The Minor's Right of Privacy:
Limitations on State Action after Danforth and Carey, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1216, 1220 n.28 (1977).
79. Carey, 431 U.S. at 693.
80. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634. Acknowledging in Carey its historical commitment to protecting
minors, the Court conceded that "in the area of sexual mores, as in other areas, the scope of permis-
sible state regulation is broader as to minors than as to adults." Carey, 431 U.S. at 694. Without
elaborating further, the Court notes only that "the Constitution does not bar state regulation of the
sexual behavior of minors." Id. Although "the power of the state to control the conduct of children
reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults," Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170
(1944), the question of "the extent of state power to regulate conduct of minors not constitutionally
regulable when committed by adults is a vexing one, perhaps not susceptible of precise answer."
Carey, 431 U.S. at 692.
In Michael M. v. Sonoma County Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981), the Court upheld the convic-
tion of a minor male for violating a statutory rape law prohibiting sexual intercourse with a female
under 18 years of age. The Court upheld the statute against an equal protection challenge to its
gender discrimination; only males could be convicted under the law. The defendant did not chal-
lenge the statute's regulation of sexual conduct on privacy grounds, and the Court did not address
the constitutional issues that such a challenge would have raised.
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imprudence. 8' The state's interest in protecting its young people from
harm, however, does not affect the fundamental nature of the minor's
right, but rather, is a separate factor to be weighed in order to evaluate
whether the right is burdened justifiably. In itself, the state interest does
nothing to diminish the fundamental nature of the minor's constitutional
right.82 Accordingly, this note will consider the implications of the fact
that minors are involved, in light of the relevant governmental
interests.8 3
By burdening a minor's decision to seek contraception free from un-
justified governmental interference, the mandatory parental notification
requirement imposed by the "squeal rule" may infringe the minor's right
of privacy. It abridges both the right to obtain and use contraceptives,
and the implicit right to engage in non-marital sexual activity.84
B. Burdening the Right of Privacy.
By imposing a mandatory parental notification/consent requirement
on a minor's decision to obtain contraceptives from Title X clinics, the
81. Cf Hafen, supra note 75, at 513 ("To be protected against [the] risk [of] . . . childish
choices. . . requires a restriction on the range of choice requirements."); see also H.L. v. Matheson,
450 U.S. 398, 422 (1981) ("The State's interest in protecting a young person from harm justifies the
imposition of restraints on his or her freedom even though comparable restraints on adults would be
constitutionally impermissible.") (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 102-03
(1976)).
82. One commentator has erroneously blurred the distinction between rights and state interests,
by arguing that a curious tension exists between the state interest and the right whenever a funda-
mental right is involved:
While the fundamental nature of constitutional rights argues for their free extension to
minors without imposition of a capacity requirement, the exercise of these rights often
involves activities posing risks which minors have normally been considered to be incapa-
ble of understanding. Thus, minors have been accorded significant constitutional protec-
tion where exercise of the right involves few risks but have generally been denied
constitutional rights. . . where the activity involved has traditionally been viewed as pos-
ing serious consequences for the minor.
Note, supra note 78, at 1221-22. This tension is acutely present in the area of contraceptive rights
for minors since the decisions to use contraceptives or to undergo an abortion often carry serious
long-term risks to the physical and psychological health of a teenage girl which may not be immedi-
ately obvious to her. The risks associated with the use of contraceptives are significantly fewer than
those associated with abortion which is, by contrast, a major medical procedure. See infra notes
166-69. Because the alternative to contraception and abortion, however, often is to carry a preg-
nancy to term, see infra text accompanying note 170, a realistic approach would require this balanc-
ing test to factor in the risks associated with teenage pregnancy.
83. -See infra text accompanying notes 116-161.
84. The DHHS regulation also infringes the right to confidentiality regarding personal informa-
tion. Because the right to confidentiality is itself a very broad area with only tangential associations
to sexual privacy, an in-depth discussion of this aspect of the minor's privacy is beyond the scope of
this note. See generally Note, The Constitutional Right to Confidentiality, 51 GEO. WAsH. L. REV.
133 (1982); Tettenborn, Breach of Confidence, Publicity and the Public Interest, 98 LAW Q. REv. 5
(1982); Comment, Administrative Investigation-Resisting Government Acquisition of Confidential
Information, 28 U. KAN. L. REv. 447 (1980).
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"squeal rule" unduly burdens the minor's right to alone make such per-
sonal decisions. By thus requiring the minor to forfeit her constitutional
right to make those decisions individually without parental involvement
as a condition of receiving the federally funded benefits of Title X, the
DHHS regulation impermissibly burdens the right of privacy by attach-
ing unconstitutional conditions on its exercise.
The DHHS defends its current regulations in part on the ground
that there is no interference with the minor's personal decision. Accord-
ing to the DHHS, there is no interference because: (1) the minor is not
required to include her parents in the decisionmaking process; 85 (2) the
notification requirement does not give parents the kind of veto power
implicit in a consent requirement;8 6 and (3) there are alternative non-
Title X means of obtaining contraceptives. 87
1. Parental Involvement in the Decisionmaking Process. The first
argument of DHHS is that there is no interference with the minor's per-
sonal decision because notification is required only after contraceptives
have been obtained;88 the minor is not required, therefore, to include her
parents in the actual decisionmaking process. 89 DHHS further argues
that the "parental notification regulation does not prevent any parent or
guardian who receives a notice from refusing to become involved in any
way in decisions about a child's sexual activities. . . . It merely provides
the opportunity for participation if the parent elects to become
involved." 90
These arguments are defective. First, the timing distinction at-
tempted by DHHS ignores the reality that the mere threat of unwelcome
parental involvement in the minor's contraceptive decision is likely to
have a significant deterrent effect on a minor's use of Title X clinics. 9'
85. Brief for DHHS, supra note 35, at 25-26.
86. Id. at 26.
87. Id. at 13, 45.
88. The regulation provides in part that: "a project shall, [w]hen prescription drugs or pre-
scription devices are initially provided by the project to an unemancipated minor, notify a parent or
guardian that they were provided, within 10 working days following their provision." 42 CF.R.
§ 59.5(a)(12)(i)(A) (1983) (emphasis added).
89. DHHS contends that the notification requirement does not necessarily ensure parental in-
volvement, but rather "provides [only] the opportunity for participation if the parent elects to become
involved." Brief for DHHS, supra note 35, at 26 (emphasis added), Even if one concedes this dis-
tinction in the actual decisionmaking process, it acknowledges only a short-lived right of privacy.
Contraceptive care commonly requires a continuing relationship with the physician in order to ob-
tain prescription refills or to ensure that the diaphragm or IUD does not need refitting or replacing.
Thus, even if a teenage girl physically can obtain some method of contraception, not subject to her
parent's approval during her first visit to the clinic, her parents' subsequent disapproval after being
notified may inhibit a second visit.
90. Brief for DHHS, supra note 35, at 25-26 (emphasis added).
91. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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Second, by conditioning active parental involvement on the parent's
choice to initiate discussion with his or her minor child,92 rather than on
the teenager's preference, the regulation effectively undermines the mi-
nor's ability to remain independent in the process.
2. Notification as Consent. DHHS further argues93 that the regula-
tions are not impermissibly intrusive because they do not give anyone,
including parents, the kind of veto power over the minor's decision that
the Supreme Court struck down in both Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth 94 and Bellotti v. Baird.95 In Danforth, the Court invalidated por-
tions of a Missouri statute that required a female seeking an abortion to
obtain spousal consent if married, or parental consent if unmarried and
under the age of eighteen. 96 Relying on Danforth, the Court held in Bel-
lotti v. Baird that if a state requires a pregnant minor to obtain parental
consent for an abortion, it must also provide an alternative means of se-
curing authorization for the abortion in the absence of parental consent,
in order to ensure that the parent does not exercise an "absolute, and
possibly arbitrary, veto that was found impermissible in Danforth."97
It is true that notification requirements generally are considered to
be less intrusive than consent requirements, 98 but notification require-
ments may nevertheless place unconstitutional burdens on fundamental
rights. The obstacles notification creates, moreover, are particularly
long-lived in the area of contraception which, unlike abortion, is not a
92. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
93. Brief for DHHS, supra note 35, at 47.
94. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
95. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
96. 428 U.S. at 69, 74. By involving a third party, usually a spouse or a parent, in a female's
decision to use contraceptives or obtain an abortion, consent provisions generally encourage the
third party to contribute to the outcome of the decision. Because the view of only one party can
prevail in the event of a disagreement, the effect of a consent requirement is to give a veto power to a
third party whose interest is merely derivative of the woman's more direct interest. See id. at 71
("Inasmuch as it is the woman who physically bears the child and who is the more directly and
immediately affected by the pregnancy, .... the balance weighs in her favor.").
97. 443 U.S. at 644.
98. See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 n.17 (1981) (Court declined to equate notice
and consent requirements); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979) (Court declined to equate
notice and consent requirements). This argument carries little weight, however, if one accepts the
proposition that "it is the presence of the notice requirement, and not merely its implementation in a
particular case, that signifies the intrusion." H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 440 n.27 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added); see Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. 658, 666
n.13 (D.D.C. 1983) ("the mere proposal of the notification requirement resulted in a significant drop
in adolescent attendance at family planning clinics") (emphasis in original); see also Note, supra note
78, at 1240 (Because the prospect of parental involvement may be sufficient to discourage many
minors from obtaining contraceptives or safe, legal abortions, notice requirements burden the mi-
nor's choice in much the same manner as parental consent requirements.).
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one-time incident subject to a one-time veto.99 On the contrary, because
contraception implies a continuing pattern of activity which may be sub-
ject to parental restriction beyond the initial visit to the clinic, '00 notifica-
tion in the context of contraception more closely resembles the kind of
deference to parental approval that consent provisions mandate. Even if
a parent cannot veto a minor child's decision to obtain contraceptives the
first time, because notification would not be given until after contracep-
tives had already been provided, parental disapproval after that notifica-
tion could inhibit the minor from returning to the clinic for a second visit
to obtain additional contraceptives, or from using the contraceptives she
has already obtained. Because the regulation alerts parents not simply to
the occurrence of an isolated event, but also affords them an intimate
knowledge of their child's ongoing conduct, it may significantly affect the
parent-child relationship in a variety of contexts. Through such influ-
ences it may affect indirectly the minor's decision to obtain or use
contraceptives. 101
In addition to imposing this intrusive notification requirement on
the low-income minors who qualify for Title X services, the DHHS regu-
lation also may infringe the privacy rights of minors who do not qualify
for such services. The DHHS regulation arguably operates as a de facto
consent requirement102 by denying federally subsidized contraceptive
services to minors of moderate- and high-income families who must in
turn rely on their parents to subsidize the considerably higher cost of
private contraceptive care.
3. Unconstitutional Conditions. The "squeal rule" further in-
fringes the minor's right of privacy by placing unconstitutional condi-
99. Arguably, a decision concerning contraception is not directly analogous to the abortion
decision in that the latter is compounded by inherent time limitations necessitating a speedy resolu-
tion. In this view, the minor's decision to use contraceptives has been more closely likened to the
minor's decision to marry and the attendant restrictions thereto. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood
Ass'n v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. 1001, 1008 & n.7 (D. Utah 1983) (citing Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F.
Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (upholding New York law prohibiting the marriage of minors between
the ages of 14 and 18 absent the consent of both parents)). The contraceptive decision bears more
similarity to the abortion decision than to the decision to marry, however, in that "it cannot be
delayed until the minor reaches the age of majority without posing the risk of serious harm to the
minor." Matheson, 582 F. Supp. at 1008-09. As the Dinkins court noted, "[g]iving birth to an un-
wanted child involves an irretrievable change in position for a minor as well as for an adult, whereas
the temporary denial of the right to marry does not." 533 F. Supp. at 630.
100. See supra note 89.
101. Justice Marshall has observed that the consequences of revealing such a confidential deci-
sion may lead to "parental disappointment and disapproval,. . . physical or emotional abuse, with-
drawal of financial support, or actual obstruction of the abortion decision." H.L. v. Matheson, 450
U.S. at 438-39 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Similar consequences may follow from notification regard-
ing contraceptive use. See supra note 46.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
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tions on her exercise of that right. DHHS maintains that the right of
access to contraceptives is unimpaired because Title X services remain
readily available to those who are willing to tolerate the attached condi-
tion of parental notification,10 3 and because non-Title X contraceptive
options exist for those who would forego parental notification. 04
It is well-established that the decision whether to subsidize constitu-
tionally protected activity "is a question for Congress to answer, not a
matter of constitutional entitlement."' 1 5 Once the legislature chooses to
fund such activity, however, "the manner in which it dispenses benefits is
subject to constitutional limitations." 10 6 More specifically, the power of
the state to attach conditions to the grant of a privilege is limited in one
crucial respect: "it may not impose conditions which require the relin-
quishment of constitutional rights."10 7 In implementing Title X, Con-
gress has chosen to subsidize the constitutionally protected activity of
obtaining contraceptive care. Having done so, it must ensure that the
subsidy is distributed in a constitutionally permissible way. By attaching
certain "conditions" to eligibility for federally funded benefits, however,
the DHHS regulation in effect exerts a coercive pressure on the teenager
to choose between receiving contraceptives on the government's terms or
exercising her constitutional right to make a private decision-at the ex-
pense of those benefits.10 8 As such, the regulation seems to fall within
that category of restrictions prohibited by the Supreme Court as penaliz-
ing the exercise of a constitutional right. 10 9
In light of these unconstitutional conditions, the DHHS' insistence
on the viability of alternatives to Title X services is of little consequence.
The existence of such options fails to remedy the constitutional deficien-
cies of the "squeal rule" itself. Moreover, the perceived emergency
103. Reply Brief for DHHS at 33, Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Reply Brief for DHHS].
104. Brief for DHHS, supra note 35, at 45. DHHS urges that lenient parental notification prac-
tices among private physicians dispensing contraceptives to minors make it "easy" to obtain pre-
scription contraceptives from non-Title X sources without notification. Reply Brief for DHHS,
supra note 103, at 31 n.18. This assertion is based on a nationwide survey of pediatricians that
indicated that 79% would provide contraceptive services to 14-year old girls without notifying their
parents, and that 94% would do so for 17-year old girls. Id.
105. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980).
106. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469-70 (1977).
107. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 337 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Frost & Frost Trucking
Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926)); see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406
(1963).
108. Cf Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406
(1963) ("to condition the availability of benefits upon this appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal
principle of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties").
109. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (providing a list of areas to which the
prohibition against denial of benefits has been applied).
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which motivated Congress to enact and amend Title X suggests that, in
the view of the legislature, these alternatives are not viable.110
C. Governmental Interests.
Statutes and regulations that burden fundamental constitutional
rights typically may be upheld if they serve a "compelling state interest."
Such statutes and regulations must be narrowly drawn to reflect "only
the legitimate state interests at stake.111 In the area of minors' funda-
mental rights, however, the Supreme Court has developed a less rigorous
variation of the compelling state interest test. Under this modified test,
restrictions on minors' privacy rights will be upheld if they serve any
"significant state interest . . . that it is not present in the case of an
adult." 112
The cases that require that the state interest be only "significant"
rather than "compelling," under this lesser standard of scrutiny, fail to
articulate the corresponding degree to which the restriction must serve
the interest. Rather, they require only that the restriction "serve" the
state interest, without elaborating on the extent to which an otherwise
burdensome regulation must satisfy this requirement. 1 3 For the pur-
poses of this note, it is assumed that the less rigorous variation of the
state interest standard where minors are involved implies a correspond-
ing leniency in the strength of the relationship needed to further the in-
terest. Therefore, to withstand constitutional scrutiny, a regulation
burdening minors' fundamental rights probably would not have to be
"necessary" to achieve the significant state interest. The fundamental
nature of the minor's privacy right, on the other hand, requires that it
satisfy considerably more than a mere "rational relationship" test.
The more appropriate standard in these instances arguably bears a
closer resemblance to the intermediate level of scrutiny that the Supreme
110. Indeed, had non-Title X contraceptive sources been regarded as a viable and effective alter-
native, the teenage pregnancy rate would not have risen to epidemic proportions, thereby creating
the kind of emergency to which Congress was responding. See supra note 29-30 and accompanying
text.
111. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
112. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976); see also Carey, 431 U.S. at 693
n.15 (citations omitted):
Such lesser scrutiny is appropriate both because of the State's greater latitude to regulate
the conduct of children, . . . and because the right of privacy implicated here is "the inter-
est in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions," ... and the law has
generally regarded minors as having a lesser capability for making important decisions.
113. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 693 (prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to minors does not
serve a significant state interest); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75 (requiring consent




Court has carved out in gender classification cases. 114 Under this stan-
dard, which requires a showing of an important state interest, the regula-
tion must satisfy a "substantial relationship" test.115 Accordingly, the
DHHS regulation must be at least substantially related to a significant
state interest if the interest exists exclusively where minors are involved.
If, on the other hand, an identical state interest exists with respect to
adults as well, the regulation must be necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest. If minority is irrelevant to the state's legitimate goals, then
it simply cannot serve as a rationale to limit constitutional rights.
This note will examine three state interests that exist only when mi-
nors are involved and which, therefore, need only be "significant":
(1) protecting the welfare of minors; (2) protecting interests related to
parental involvement; and (3) protecting the morality of minors. In addi-
tion, the note will consider the state interests in the health of its citizens
and in allocating scarce financial resources, both of which apply to adults
as well as minors, and must therefore be "compelling."
1. Protecting the Welfare of Minors. The state's interest in protect-
ing the welfare of its young people is well-recognized.116 Exercising its
powers to tax and spend and to regulate commerce, the federal govern-
ment may also act to promote health and welfare.'1 7 The protective no-
tion of the state as parens patriae is based in large part upon the doctrine
of capacity which assumes that minors are unable to understand fully
and consent to the consequences of certain decisions.1 8 In the interests
of protecting a minor against her own immature and imprudent deci-
sions, the state may impose considerable restraints. Additionally, the
114. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives").
115. Id. Compare Michael M. v. Sonoma County Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981), in which the
Supreme Court applied the "substantial relationship" test in upholding the constitutionality of a
state statute criminalizing the act of sexual intercourse with a female under the age of 18. Although
Michael M, was resolved on gender discrimination grounds, in that females were not subject to
criminal prosecution for engaging in sexual activity with underage males, the case nevertheless re-
flects the Court's unwillingness to require a higher degree of scrutiny where the sexual activity of
minors is at issue. Even Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, conceded that regulating the
sexual activity of minors by threat of criminal prosecution might be permissible as long as it is
achieved in a gender-neutral way. Id. at 493-94. See also Carey, 431 U.S. at 705 (Powell, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) ("There is. . . no justification for subjecting restrictions on the
sexual activity of the young to heightened judicial review.").
116. See, e.g., Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) ("[T]he State is entitled to adjust its legal
system to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for 'concern, . . sympathy, and. ..
paternal attention.' ") (quoting Meheiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971)).
117. See supra note 65.
118. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 72 ("Certain decisions are considered by
the State to be outside the scope of a minor's ability to act in his own best interest or in the interest of
the public .... "). See generally Note, supra note 78, at 1220-23.
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state's interest in protecting the welfare of minors encompasses the mi-
nor's health and the nature of the contraceptive decision.
As presently drafted, the DHHS regulation is unconstitutional inso-
far as it seeks to protect all minors from their presumptively immature
decisions. Courts have developed a "mature minor exception" to tradi-
tional judicial deference to parental authority because some minors are
mature enough to understand the nature and implications of their deci-
sions.1 19 The exception has developed most notably in relation to paren-
tal consent requirements for medical treatment of minors. 120 Under the
"mature minor exception," a minor seeking medical care may bypass the
need to obtain parental consent if she can convince a court that she is
sufficiently mature to act in her best interests, and thus, to make an in-
dependent judgment to consent to treatment.1 2 1 A judicial determination
of maturity provides an alternative authorization for a minor to engage
in a desired activity,12 2 even in the absence of parental consent. As such,
a finding of maturity on the part of the minor satisfies the state's interest
in eliminating the dangers incident to immature decisionmaking.
This distinction between mature and immature minors is firmly
rooted in the Supreme Court's treatment of the right of privacy. Indeed,
each of the Court's abortion decisions involving minors carefully deline-
ates the right of privacy according to the maturity of the parties seeking
119. As one commentator has noted, "the evolution of exceptions to the parental consent re-
quirement reflects an increasing sensitivity to the child as a person . . . ." Note, Parental Consent
Requirements and Privacy Rights of Minors: The Contraceptive Controversy, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1001,
1003 (1975). For a discussion of the three major exceptions-emergency, emancipation, and matur-
ity-that have developed in response to parental consent requirement, see generally id.
120. Applicability of the "mature minor rule" depends upon "an analysis of the nature of the
[medical procedure], its likely benefit, and the capacity of the particular minor to understand fully
what the. . . procedure involves." Baird v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. 741, 754, 360 N.E.2d 288,
295 (1977). There are, however, some difficulties in applying the rule. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
at 643 n.23 ("it [is] difficult to define, let alone determine, maturity"). One commentator has sug-
gested that sexual activity accompanied by an awareness of the importance of contraception may, in
itself, be a sign of sufficient maturity to make contraceptive decisions. Hofmann, Consent and Confl-
dentiality and Their Legal and Ethical Implications for Adolescent Medicine, in MEDICAL CARE OF
THE ADOLESCENT 42, 51 (3d ed. 1976).
But the opposite conclusion may also justify judicial consent as a protective measure in the
minor's best interests:
The sexually active 15-year-old is given access to birth control not out of recognition of his
or her mature judgment. Indeed, the less equipped a particular individual is for the bur-
dens of parenthood, the stronger the argument against denying access to contraceptives
when we cannot deny access to sex.
F. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 63 (1982).
121. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 91; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 650.
122. Once a finding has been made that a minor is mature and competent to make an independ-
ent decision, it is unconstitutional for judicial authorization to be withheld. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. at 651.
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to forego parental involvement. In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,123
which invalidated a parental consent requirement for abortion, the Court
emphasized that its holding was not intended to "suggest that every mi-
nor, regardless of age or maturity, may give effective consent for termina-
tion of her pregnancy."' 24 Similarly, in Bellotti v. Baird, 25 the Court
reasoned that a parental consent requirement for immature minors seek-
ing abortions might withstand constitutional scrutiny because the state's
interest in ensuring parental consultation is enhanced when immature
minors are involved.1 26 In H.L. v. Matheson,127 the Court indicated that
the distinction between maturity and immaturity applied to situations
involving notification, as well as consent. Noting that the minor plaintiff
in the case failed to allege maturity, the Court upheld a parental notifica-
tion condition to abortion only insofar as it applied to "immature, depen-
dent minor[s]."1 28
In its most recent set of abortion cases, the Court has reaffirmed its
commitment to the mature minor exception. 129 Insisting on the availa-
bility of a judicial determination of maturity, Justice Powell, writing for
the Court in Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, emphasized that
a finding of maturity provides sufficient authorization for a minor to ex-
ercise her right of privacy without confirmation by third parties. 130
Given this broader right of mature minors to make independent judg-
ments, the Court, in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health,1 31 held unconstitutional "a blanket determination that all minors
under [a state-designated age] are too immature to make" a privacy
decision.' 32
Despite these judicially recognized differences based on maturity,
the DHHS regulation fails to distinguish between mature and immature
minors. Rather, it applies generally to "unemancipated minors," which
is further defined as "an individual who is age 17 or under and is not,
123. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
124. Id. at 75.
125. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
126. Id. at 640.
127. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
128. Id. at 409. As the concurring opinion observed, the limited nature of the Court's holding
reserved the separate issue whether the same notification requirement unconstitutionally burdened
the privacy right of a mature minor. Id. at 414 (Powell, J., concurring).
129. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2491 n.10,
2498 (1983) (adopting the plurality's conclusion in Bellotti that a state must provide an alternative
procedure for minors to demonstrate maturity); See also Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 103
S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (1983) ("It is clear" that a state must provide such alternative procedures.).
130. 103 S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (1983).
131. 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
132. Id. In City of Akron, the threshhold age was as low as 15 years old. 103 S. Ct. at 2498.
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with respect to factors other than age, emancipated under State law.' 33
To withstand constitutional scrutiny, a burdensome regulation "must be
narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate State interests at stake." 134
While the regulation is intended to protect minors from their own imma-
ture decisions, the regulation applies to many older unemancipated mi-
nors between the ages of sixteen and seventeen 35 who regularly use
contraceptive services and would fall within the mature minor exception.
As such, the regulation operates as a blanket presumption of immaturity
in contravention of the Court's insistence on a case-by-case determina-
tion of maturity.
The state may claim that its interest in protecting the welfare of its
minors is enhanced considerably given the serious nature of the contra-
ceptive decision and the potential risks associated with teenage preg-
nancy and abortion. 136 To allow the importance of the decision itself to
justify greater state interference, however, suggests that the state has a
corresponding interest in "maximizing the probability that the decision
[will] be made correctly." 137 This view is problematic because many of
the reasons posited to justify greater state interference are precisely the
same reasons that make the decision so fundamental to the individual's
freedom of choice. To permit these same concerns to justify the imposi-
tion of state-mandated standards of correctness, 38 therefore, is to under-
mine the very essence of the right of privacy that guarantees individual
autonomy to make personal decisions regarding procreative choices. 39
Given this conflict, it is doubtful that the state's interest in protecting the
welfare of its minors by ensuring "correct" responses to certain decisions
rises to the level of a significant state interest.
133. 48 Fed. Reg. 3600, 3614 (1983) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 59.5(a)(12)(i)(C)). The Secre-
tary's proferred reason for failing to distinguish between mature and immature minors is that "a
mature minor exception . . . would present major administrative difficulties for projects and en-
forcement difficulties for the government." Id. at 3611 (Secretary's Preamble).
134. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
135. In a representative sampling of unemancipated family planning patients, 46% were 17 years
old, 30% were 16 years old, 17% were 15 years old, and 7% were 14 years old or younger. Torres,
Forest & Eisman, supra note 37, at 289-90.
136. See infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text. To some extent, this argument duplicates
the state's concerns with protecting minors from their immature and imprudent decisions. See supra
note 120.
137. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 103 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
138. See Note, supra note 78, at 1235-36. Indeed, "the very concept of a right of privacy, with
its insistence on a neutral state posture towards the ultimate outcome of the decision, seems to deny
the state the power to define 'correct' and 'incorrect' choices." Id. at 1236.
139. Eisenstadt v. Baird makes clear that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
[that] so fundamentally affectD a person. ... 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis in original).
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Even if the government's interest in ensuring a "correct" result were
regarded as valid, and even if the regulation were not strikingly underin-
clusive as a health measure, it is nevertheless doubtful that the DHHS
regulation requiring parental involvement and the purported health goal
are correlated. In light of the statistical likelihood of increased preg-
nancy and abortion among teenagers under the current DHHS regula-
tion,14° sexually active minors who seek contraceptive protection may be
doing more to protect their own welfare than is the government. Thus,
the regulation is not even substantially related to the state's goal of pro-
tecting the welfare of its minors.
The DHHS regulation arguably is intended to further the state's in-
terest in protecting the health of its minors, without reference to the ma-
turity of their decisions. Because this health interest is present where
both adults and minors are involved, however, it must qualify as a "com-
pelling," rather than a merely "significant," state interest. The state's
interest in the health of its citizens arguably satisfies this test. 14' It is not
entirely clear, however, how a regulation that applies only to minors may
be said to be "necessary" to further the valid state interests at stake.
Indeed, the regulation is grossly underinclusive for failing to apply com-
parable safeguards to adult women using equally hazardous contracep-
tives.142 Limiting the regulation's application to minor females suggests
the pretextual nature of the state's interest in protecting the health of
minors.
2. Interests Related to Parental Involvement. Parental notification
requirements reflect the state's interest in ensuring that principal family
members take part in the child's contraceptive decisionmaking process.
The DHHS regulation, therefore, might be justified as an effort to engage
sexually active minors and their parents in a meaningful dialogue to ad-
vance the following goals: (1) protecting parental sovereignty; (2) en-
couraging a carefully reasoned decision by the minor through the
140. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51. The consequences that the DHHS regulation
may have on health are discussed separately because the state's interest in citizens' health should
apply to both adults and minors. See infra text accompanying notes 162-72.
141. See infra notes 162-70 and accompanying text.
142. The health risks associated with prescription contraceptives are significantly higher for
older women than for teenagers. The mortality rate for the pill, for example, is 28.2 times higher for
nonsmoking women between the ages of 35-39 than for nonsmoking females between the ages of 15-
19, and 64 times greater for women aged 40-44. Similarly, the risks associated with the pill for
smoking women are 21.5 times greater between the ages of 35-39, and 49 times greater between the
ages of 40-44, than for their smoking counterparts aged 15-19. Thus, in light of the relative health
risks for women in various age groups, the DHHS can hardly justify its focus on the group with the
lowest risk in the absence of comparable safeguards for the older group that is exposed to greater
danger. ALAN GUTrMACHER INST., supra note 21, at 35.
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contribution of parental experience, knowledge, and guidance; or (3) pro-
moting positive family communication in general.
The legitimacy of either of the first two goals depends on the extent
to which parental involvement amounts to control of the outcome of the
minor's privacy decision. 143 Protecting parental sovereignty and al-
lowing parents to forbid their children's access to and use of contracep-
tives in order to mandate abstinence is tantamount to authorizing the
kind of parental veto power that the Court repeatedly has denounced.4
This interest, therefore, cannot be deemed "significant." Encouraging
parental input in a counseling capacity, on the other hand, may be a
permissible goal, 145 as long as it does not ultimately substitute the par-
ent's choice for the child's. Similarly, the goal of promoting positive fam-
ily communication arguably appears to be significant.
The extent to which state-mandated notification actually serves
either significant goal of promoting intrafamily communication or im-
proving the quality of the minor's decisional framework, however, is
questionable. A primary purpose of Title X clinics is to educate patients,
particularly minors, about birth control methods, and the responsibilities
and consequences of being sexually active.146 In light of the reality that
many minors will not discuss their contraceptive decision with their par-
ents or other adults,147 the educative practices which Title X clinics em-
143. But cf Note, supra note 78, at 1235-36 (arguing that even state efforts to assure that minors
make well-reasoned contraceptive decisions are improper because they presume "that the quality of
such choices can be measured against an objective and ascertainable standard").
144. See Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 643-44 (if state requires a minor to obtain parental consent,
procedure must not amount to an "absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto"); Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 73-74 (states lack the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute
veto over the decision of the physician and his patient). Even if this were a permissible goal, how-
ever, studies consistently demonstrate that neither parental restrictions nor the unavailability of con-
traceptives significantly deters teenage sexual activity. See supra note 46.
145. Cf Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1169 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829 (1980)
(although parents understandably are concerned about their adolescents' sexual activity and contra-
ceptive use, their interest does not rise to the level of warranting constitutional protection).
146. The practices of a publicly operated family planning clinic in Lansing, Michigan may serve
as an illustration. Before contraceptives are dispensed, minors must participate in at least one
weekly "rap session" conducted by the center's counseling staff. The sessions deal with factual issues
about birth control methods, and are intended to stimulate discussion about nonmedical aspects of
teenage sexuality as well. A complete medical history of the minor is required in order to detect
medical problems which might be aggravated by a particular contraceptive. If, after a physical
exam, no medical problems appear, a three-month supply of oral contraceptives ordinarily will be
provided, if this is the patient's preference. If the patient returns for an additional supply of pills,
another physical exam will be made and the physician will inquire about any contraindicative symp-
toms. A physician always makes the final evaluation about whether a minor should receive a partic-
ular contraceptive. Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1163-64 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829
(1980).
147. Most clinics stress the desirability of communicating with parents on a voluntary basis
about the decision to be sexually active. Id. at 1163.
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ploy148 are designed to ensure that the minor's decision is reasonably
well-informed and poses no significant health risks. 149 It seems unlikely,
in most cases, that lay parental input can materially supplement expert
medical information.
Proponents of family participation argue that decisions involving
teenage sexual activity, contraception, abortion, and pregnancy involve
additional factors "much more profound than a mere medical judg-
ment" I °50 that a parent is best suited to address. Although there is con-
siderable merit to this argument, it is premised on an assumption that
parents will respond rationally and in a helpful manner to the news of the
child's sexual activity. In reality, parents frequently do not respond in a
manner that contributes meaningfully to the minor's decision. 151 More-
over, by impersonally notifying parents152 only after the child has carried
out her decision to obtain contraceptives, and, in many instances, after
she has become sexually active, the rule draws parents abruptly into the
picture without establishing a framework within which to begin mean-
ingful communication. Finally, the fact that the minor already has cho-
sen not to consult her parents may be symptomatic of a deeper
psychological schism between the parent and child 153 that may make
constructive parental input unlikely. The probable effect of notification
is only to deepen this schism. Seen in this context, the "squeal rule" does
148. See supra note 146.
149. The health considerations inherent in the decision to use contraceptives are discussed infra
at notes 162-72 and accompanying text. It is true that the decision to use contraceptives does not
require the same kind of complex medical judgment that is usually involved in the decision to have
an abortion. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 699-700 n.25 (1977). Nevertheless, the
use of prescription contraceptives requires a medical determination of the suitability of a particular
method and the dosage and size to be prescribed, based on an evaluation of the individual patient.
150. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 104 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
151. Because of the sensitive moral and religious issues involved in the knowledge that an adoles-
cent daughter is sexually active, a parent may often react emotionally rather than rationally. There
are numerous instances of parents responding to such knowledge in a manner that is not consistent
with the child's best interest. See, e.g., Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, 1001 (D. Mass. 1978)
(some parents will insist on an undesired marriage, or in the case of a pregnant minor, on carrying
the pregnancy to term as punishment), af'd, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Jolly, Young, and Female, and
Outside the Law, in TEENAGE WOMEN IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: CHANGING VALUES
97,102 (1979) ("When a young girl becomes pregnant, many families refuse to allow her back into
their home."), quoted in H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 438 n.24 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Note,
supra note 78, at 1222-23 n.42.
152. A notice that the minor has received contraceptives is required to be sent to the parents
within 10 working days by certified mail "or other similar form of documentation" in order to verify
that it has been received. 42 C.F.R. § 59.5(a)(12)(i)(A) (1983).
153. Cf Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 793-94 (5th Cir. 1975), af'd mem., 428 U.S. 901 (1976)
("The fact that the minor became pregnant and sought an abortion contrary to the parents' wishes




not seem to bear a necessary or even a substantial relation to the promo-
tion of meaningful parent-child communication. 154
3. Moral Interests. A third state interest existing only when mi-
nors are involved is the promotion of the child's morality. State statutes
prohibiting fornication, statutory rape, and access to pornography by mi-
nors, for example, reflect government's continuing concern with the
moral environment of its minor citizens. Similarly, the "squeal rule"
may be designed to discourage teenage sexual activity in the interests of
majoritarian morality.155 There is some question, however, whether the
rule actually furthers such an interest. By dispensing contraceptives to
minors before parents have been notified, 156 and by offering to provide
"referrals to other sources of prescription contraceptives"'' 5 7 without pa-
rental notification, the DHHS regulation does not directly control
whether minors ultimately use contraceptives.
Even if the moral interest were served by the regulation, whether it
can be deemed "significant" depends on the scope of the minor's consti-
tutionally protected right of privacy. The Supreme Court repeatedly has
declined to consider whether the right of privacy contemplates a right to
engage in consensual sexual behavior, 158 nor has it definitively drawn the
boundaries of the state's interest in regulating the sexual conduct of its
youth. 15 9 Recognition of a right to engage in sexual activity as inferred
through the established right to obtain and use contraceptives, 160 how-
ever, renders the state's interest in prohibiting such activity insignificant.
Even assuming no constitutionally protected right to engage in
nonmarital sexual activity exists, evidence compiled by social scientists
conclusively demonstrates that placing restrictions on contraceptive
availability will not, in the final analysis, deter adolescent sexual activ-
154. The lines of communication existing within a family "must depend on the quality of emo-
tional attachments within the family, and not on legal patterns imposed by the State." H.L. v.
Matheson, 450 U.S. at 437 n.22 (Marshall, J., dissenting). A majority of the Supreme Court has
conceded this to be true in its rejection of spousal consent requirements for abortion: "[I]t is difficult
to believe that the goal of fostering mutuality and trust in a marriage, and of strengthening the
marital relationship and the marriage institution, will be achieved by giving the husband a veto
power.... Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71.
155. DHHS itself conceded that "encouraging adolescent sexual abstinence" was one of the pri-
mary goals of the regulation. Brief for DHHS, supra note 35, at 13.
156. 42 C.F.R. § 59.5(a)(12)(i)(A) (1983). In fact, DHHS chose not to adopt aprior notification
requirement out of concern that it would "unduly delay or otherwise restrict access to services for
adolescents." 48 Fed. Reg. 3600, 3604 (1983).
157. Brief for DHHS, supra note 35, at 13.
158. See, e.g., Carey, 431 U.S. at 694 n.17 (1977) (Supreme Court has not determined whether
the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating private consensual sexual behavior among
adults).
159. See supra note 80.
160. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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ity.161 Thus, whatever significant interest the state may have in regulat-
ing teenage sexuality, the "squeal rule" does little to further this interest.
4. Health Interests. The state has an interest in protecting the
health of its citizens. 162 Governmental attempts to regulate the use and
distribution of contraceptives typically reflect a concern with regulating
the consumption or use of hazardous substances.1 63
It may be argued that the notification requirement furthers this in-
terest either by restricting the use of hazardous substances, or by mini-
mizing the risks incident to their use through parental involvement.
However, although the state's interest in protecting the health of its citi-
zens may be compelling, the notification requirement does not further
this interest. The ability of lay parents to ensure the proper use of con-
traceptives is limited,1 64 and, by restricting the availability of affordable
contraceptive care, mandatory notification increases the risks incident to
sexual activity without contraceptive protection.
Despite the suggestion of DHHS, 165 the mortality risks associated
with teenage use of prescription contraceptives is extremely low.1 66 In
fact, the estimated risk of death to teenagers from use of any medically-
accepted method of birth control is much lower than the same risk from
161. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. See generally Jaffe & Dryfoos, Fertility Control
Services for Adolescents: Access and Utilization, 8 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 167 (1976); Cutright, The
Teenage Sexual Revolution and the Myth of an Abstinent Past, 4 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 24, 30-31
(1972).
162. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) ("the state has an important and legitimate interest
in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman").
163. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 450-52 (1972) (contraceptives as a hazardous
substance).
164. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. 1001, 1009 n.8 (D. Utah 1983)
(striking down a state statute identical to the "squeal rule" on the basis, inter alia, of a finding that
"there is no evidence. . . that the doctors who prescribe contraceptives for minors are performing
inadequately their obligation to consider the needs of their patients").
165. DHHS contends that the hazardous nature of prescription contraceptives is suggested by
the fact that these drugs or devices have "side effects serious enough to warrant a prescription."
Brief for DHHS, supra note 35, at 43. The reasons for requiring a prescription (and thus, the super-
vision of a physician) for oral contraceptives, IUDs, and diaphragms, however, are not primarily
related to their safety. Rather, determining proper dosages or fit, which vary from individual to
individual, in order to ensure the effectiveness of these contraceptives, ALAN GUTTMACHER INsT.,
supra note 21, at 5-7, are the main reasons for requiring supervision.
166. Contrary to popular myth, the pill, which is prescribed to 95% of the mature minors who
choose a prescription contraceptive at Title X clinics, Brief for Planned Parenthood, supra note 23,
at 33, carries the lowest risk of death of all contraceptives among nonsmoking teenagers. The esti-
mated annual numbers of deaths associated with the following methods of birth control per 100,000
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unintended pregnancy.167 Because contraceptive failure rates tend to be
higher among teenagers and low-income women generally, 168 it is espe-
cially important that these groups have affordable access to effective
methods.
Teenage pregnancy and childbirth, by contrast, pose significant risks
to the national health, both because of their impact on the physical and
psychological health of the teenage mothers and because their offspring
suffer a "higher incidence of low birth weight;. . . a higher frequency of
developmental disabilities; [and] higher infant mortality and morbid-
ity."'1 6 9 Moreover, because almost ninety-six percent of unmarried ado-
lescents who give birth choose to keep their babies, 70 the infants may
face an emotional, social, and economic environment which is inhospita-
ble to healthy development.' 7'
Thus, by restricting the availability of relatively nonhazardous pre-
scription contraceptives and by increasing the likelihood of teenage preg-
nancy172 with its attendant harms, the DHHS regulation actually defeats
the governmental interest in the health of sexually active women.
5. Fiscal Interests. The "squeal rule" 's redefinition of economic
eligibility for Title X services may be justified by the governmental inter-
est in allocating "scarce Federal dollars" to those low-income families
ALAN GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 21, at 35 (Fig. 15).
167. Over 7 per 100,000 teenagers ages 15-19 die each year as a consequence of unintended
pregnancy and childbirth when no method is used. ALAN GUTrMACHER INST., supra note 21, at
35.
168. Women under the age of 22 are approximately two times more likely to experience contra-
ceptive failure (and unintended pregnancy) as women over 30. Id. at 30 (Fig. 13). This may be
attributable to a number of factors, including less experience with contraceptive use, greater fertility,
and more frequent intercourse. Socio-economic status, in addition to age, also seems to bear some
relation to the rate of contraceptive failure. Women with annual family incomes of under $10,000
using prescription methods are two times more likely to experience contraceptive failure than those
with incomes of over $15,000. Id. at 31.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 300z(a)(5) (1982) (congressional findings). The emotional and psychological
effects of pregnancy and abortion have been shown to be considerably more traumatic in teenagers
than in adults. See generally Wallerstein, Kurtz & Bar-Din, Psychological Sequelae of Therapeutic
Abortion in Young Unmarried Women, 27 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 828 (1972). One study indi-
cated that almost 25% of all female minors who try to commit suicide do so because they are
pregnant or at least fear that they are. Teicher, A Solution to the Chronic Problem of Living: Adoles-
cent Attempted Suicide, in CURRENT ISSUES IN ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 129, 136 (. Schoolar ed.
1973).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 300z(a)(6)(B) (1982) (congressional finding).
171. In authorizing the Adolescent Family Life Demonstration Projects (Title XX), Congress
found that pregnancy and childbirth among unmarried adolescents tended to result in "a decreased
likelihood of completing schooling; a greater likelihood that an adolescent marriage will end in di-
vorce; and higher risks of employment and welfare dependency." 42 U.S.C. § 300z(a)(5) (1982) (con-
gressional finding).
172. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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who are truly in need. 173 Whatever interest the government may have in
ensuring priority care for low-income adolescents, however, is under-
mined by the notification portion of the DHHS regulation, which oper-
ates ultimately to discourage these eligible minors from using Title X
services. 17
4
Moreover, DHHS seems to ignore the soaring costs associated with
teenage pregnancies that will result from deterring contraceptive use. 175
It is estimated that almost half of all teenagers who become pregnant
carry their babies to term.1 76 Only four percent of these mothers arrange
for an adoptive family to care for the baby 77 and those who choose to
raise the child in their household incur tremendous welfare costs for the
government.178 In the long run, DHHS' attempts to cut back on the cost
of federally subsidized contraceptive services will result in far greater
economic and social costs as a result of increased teenage pregnancies
and births.
III. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has not addressed the constitutionality of
mandatory parental notification as a condition to the distribution of con-
traceptives to unemancipated minors. Despite a judicial reluctance to
construe the privacy rights of minors too broadly, the minor's interest in
obtaining affordable and effective contraceptive services seems to over-
ride any concurrent concerns of the government. The "squeal rule" seri-
ously impinges on these privacy interests. By sweeping too broadly in
applying to mature as well as immature minors, and by failing to antici-
pate the inevitable consequences of its operation, the "squeal rule" steps
outside the bounds of constitutionally acceptable regulation.
Brenda D. Hofman
173. 48 Fed. Reg. 3600, 3613 (1983).
174. DHHS observes that low-income minors voluntarily inform their parents of their contra-
ceptive practices more often than do their middle class counterparts. Id. This finding, however, is
based on a small sampling of clinics and does not conclusively refute the overwhelming evidence that
minors of all classes would be deterred by mandatory notification policies. See supra note 46 and
accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
176. 42 U.S.C. § 300z(a)(1) (1982) (congressional findings).
177. 42 U.S.C. § 300z(a)(6)(B) (1982) (congressional findings).
178. The estimated cost of raising one child in an average income family to age 22 (excluding
college costs) is $215,000. ALAN GUTrMACHER INST., supra note 21, at 24. In the case of adoles-
cent parenthood, these costs fall largely on government welfare programs. In 1978, $4.65 billion in
welfare went to households where an adolescent had a child. 124 CONG. REC. 35,621 (1978) (state-
ment of Rep. Rogers).
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